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INTERPRETATION?
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Debate over the methodology of constitutional adjudication has
in recent years been vigorous.1 Whether that debate has been fruitful
is, however, open to serious doubt.2 Particularly within, as Professor
Robin West has described it, our "fractured, relativist, nihilist, mini-
mally pluralist moral climate,"3 it is not surprising that some of the
most popular approaches to constitutional interpretation tend to rat-
ify, as much as they definitively resolve, conflicts in interpretive meth-
odologies.4 When we add in the academic bias in favor of
methodological novelty, as against mere subscription to the method-
ologically familiar, prospects for reaching consensus on constitutional
methodology become even more remote.
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
1. For a concise summary of some of the highlights, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism
Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
2. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 643 (1994) ("[tloday, constitutional adjudication is in a state of
disarray"); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitu-
tional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 588 (1985) ("debate in constitutional theory
seems interminable").
3. Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765, 771 (1992) (emphasis
deleted). See also Sotirios A. Barber, Whither Moral Realism in Constitutional Theory? A Reply
to Professor McConnell, 64 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 111,111 (1988) (moral skepticism as "entrenched
academic orthodoxy").
4. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987) (legitimizing appeals to constitutional text,
original intent, purposes, precedent, and to value-based or policy arguments); Perry, supra note
2, at 552 (referring to, if not endorsing, appeals to text, ratifier morality, precedent, current
public values, and the individual judge's own values); Robert C. Post, Theories of Constitutional
Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 29-32 (1990).
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Now, if different interpretive methodologies actually led system-
atically and consistently to different substantive adjudicative out-
comes, as some scholars seem to imagine,5 any academic consensus on
substantive constitutional issues might lead toward consensus on the
associated interpretive methodology. Whether there is any such rela-
tionship between interpretive method and substantive adjudicative
outcomes is, however, also doubtful. This essay will focus on the spe-
cial, but unusually interesting, case of natural law methodology in con-
stitutional adjudication. As we will see, otherwise plausible natural
law theories tend to be in any number of respects quite indeterminate
with regard to constitutional adjudicative outcomes, and more inde-
terminate than some available non-natural law-based alternative theo-
ries of constitutional interpretation. But as we shall also conclude, in
at least one crucial respect, the use of natural law interpretive meth-
odologies in constitutional adjudication and elsewhere is of distinct
moral value.
II. NATURAL LAW AND THE INDETERMINACY
PROBLEM
There are many ways of thinking about the idea of natural law.
This essay will not settle upon a detailed definition of natural law.
Instead, we will merely associate natural law with the familiar idea of
the existence of some degree of objectivity in ethics, in a sense to be
roughed out below.6 The problem of the multiple indeterminacies of
natural law will be illustrated with references to the work of central
natural law theorists, including that of Thomas Aquinas as well as
more modern writers.
This is not to suggest that ancient, medieval, colonial and contem-
porary natural law theorists are mutually interchangeable and like-
minded on all relevant issues. The existence of some such significant
differences among natural lawyers seems clear.7 But it is for our pur-
poses inaccurate to suggest, for example, that the medieval natural
law of Aquinas emphasized objectivity, whereas the Revolutionary
natural lawyers emphasized the merely subjective and volitional status
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 72 B.U. L. REV. 699, 699 (1992) ("[t]ake one view of [constitutional] interpretation, and
affirmative action is forbidden; take another, and it is required; take a third, and it is allowed").
6. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953); Raoul Berger, Natural
Law and Judicial Review: Reflections of an Earthbound Lawyer, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 5, 11-12
(1992); Walter Berns, Foreword: Natural Law, Natural Rights, 61 U. C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992).
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of moral claims.8 And while John Locke, for example, may on some
but not all readings be more rights-oriented than Aquinas, 9 even here,
the distinction should not be overdrawn. There is no reason not to
cite Aquinas for a derived or implied right to welfare or to life1" or for
a right to acquire and retain property,11 as much as John Locke. One
could reasonably maintain that Aquinas, along with a number of mod-
ern theorists,' 2 took an implicit right to welfare or security of life far
more seriously than did the constitutional Framers. 3
This difficulty in distilling an unequivocal natural law position on
the identification and status of rights is, as we shall see, suggestive of
the indeterminacy of any particular plausible natural law theory in
most contexts. Much of the remainder of this essay will trace some of
these indeterminacies. Preliminarily, though, let us clear away a possi-
ble complication.
It may be tempting to maintain both that natural law theory, per-
haps no less than law generally, is massively indeterminate, and simul-
taneously that natural law theory is, or tends to be, systematically
politically repressive. That some may find both these contentions
appealing, however, does not mean that they are genuinely mutually
compatible. To begin with, if indeterminacy implies unpredictability,
unreliability, or the disturbing of settled relationships, this is already
in some tension with the idea of invariably, predictably oppressive
judicial outcomes. The best reconciliation of these two theses turns
8. Such a distinction is drawn by Raoul Berger, citing Leo Strauss. See Raoul Berger,
supra note 7, at 11-12 (quoting LEO STRAuss, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES Vii-Viii
(Elisa M. Sinclair trans., 1963)). For a mere fragment of the counterevidence, see Philip A.
Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 923 &
923 n.48 (1993).
9. See Berns, supra note 7, at 2.
10. See THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AoUINAS 138 (Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953)
[hereinafter POLITICAL IDEAS] (SUMMA THEOLOGICA II, II qu. 66, art. 7) ("whatever certain
people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor";
going on to legitimize "theft" under such circumstances); id. at 46 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1, II qu.
94, art. 2; (human inclination to seek to preserve one's life as reflective of the natural law).
11. See id. at 50-53 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 94, arts. 4 & 5) (possession of individual
property and general prohibition of theft as reflective of the natural law in at least some sense).
But see POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, for an important qualification. For commentary, see
Alasdair Maclntyre, The Splendor of the Truth, 58 THOMIST 171,180 (1994) (property ownership
for Aquinas as stewardship; "theft" in cases of pressing necessity as not genuinely theft).
12. See the brief historical references in R. George Wright, Could a Constitutional Amend-
ment Be Unconstitutional?, 22 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 741, 743-44 (1991).
13. See POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10. For some relevant discussion of tie Framers, see
Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and "Liberty": Their Original Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and
Current Significance in the Debate Over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REv. 585 (1994).
[Vol. 4:463 1995]
466 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERDISCIPLINARY LAW JOURNAL
out to involve recognizing the potentially anti-repressive character of
natural law theory.
We have already alluded to Aquinas on the value of redistribu-
tion of wealth.14 More generally, even the most traditionalist of natu-
ral law theorists recognize "the plasticity of human inclinations,"15 the
range and diversity of legitimate basic human goods, 6 and the "all but
numberless variety of ways"' 7 in which persons can fulfill themselves
consistent with the natural law. It is thus unsurprising that for Aqui-
nas, "in very many, perhaps most situations of personal and social life
there are a number of incompatible right (i.e. not-wrong) options."18
These sorts of recognitions obviously open the door to pluralism,
diversity, and tolerance within natural law, with whatever degree of
enhanced indeterminacy such qualities may bring. But it remains pos-
sible to suppose that natural law theory may still involve greater
actual, or merely purported, determinacy than its rivals, insofar as nat-
ural law theory aims at moral truth. A non-natural law-based consent
theorist, 9 for example, might grant that an indeterminately wide vari-
ety of arrangements can be validly consented to. But surely a natural
law theory ultimately guided by a search for objective truth or falsity
cannot be so blithely indeterminate. Some political or legal regimes
might be freely consented to, yet remain potentially morally wrong,
on some natural law theory.
No doubt it is possible to distinguish between natural law theory
and non-natural law-based consent theory. One might even see the
contrast between emphases upon truth and upon consent as rising to
the level of a "dramatic battle12 0 in American constitutional thought.
14. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
15. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 84 (1980).
16. See id. at 84-85.
17. RALPH MCINERNEY, ETHICA THOMISTICA 49 (1982).
18. John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEM-
PORARY ESSAYS 134, 152 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). Aquinas observes that "[iln the case of
the practical reason.... which is concerned with contingent matters, such as human actions, even
though there be some necessary truth in the common principles, yet the more we descend to
what is proper and peculiar, the more deviations we find." POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at
49 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 94, art. 4). For an example of a post-Thomistic recognition of
the objective moral value of diversity, see, e.g., Karl-Otto Apel, Do We Need Universalistic Eth-
ics Today or Is This Just Eurocentric Power Ideology?, 35 UNIVERSITAs 79, 84 (1993).
19. For a recent such exposition, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 14-15 (1991).
For a general critique of Ackerman's project, see Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past,
105 HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992) (book review).
20. Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE
L.J. 449, 454 (1989).
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But the natural lawyer is hardly barred from endorsing a principle of
consent as the most important substantive principle of natural law.
There is nothing to stop the natural lawyer from embracing consent
as, for example, the touchstone of constitutional legitimacy.
This is not to suggest that a sound natural law theory ought sim-
ply to describe and apotheosize genuine consent. Setting aside the
familiar problems of consent theory,2' there must be some accounting
for such moral value as we may ascribe to consent. Consent is not
self-evidently the most fundamental moral good. This is why Bruce
Ackerman's apotheosis of free consent2" is ultimately problematic.
There must be deeper reasons for insisting upon free consent, based
perhaps in considerations of individual human dignity or respect for
individual rational capacity. But those reasons for valuing consent
may themselves set limits to the proper moral scope or value of con-
sent, as in possible cases of conflict between free consent and the dig-
nity of persons.23
Thus consent theory cannot be all there is to natural law, but the
correspondence between a given theory of natural law and consent
theory may nonetheless be substantial. More broadly, a natural law
theory need not focus simply on determinate substantive principles or
on "truth," but may focus on variable, indeterminate, or process-ori-
ented qualities such as consent or contract, democratic outcomes, his-
tory, custom, tradition, or even Burkean "prejudice."24 Aquinas' own
natural law theory, for example, perhaps along with that of the consti-
tutional Framers, relies at crucial point not on self-evident truths, but
on the habits, inclinations, history, traditions, and customs of a partic-
ular people, particularly at the level of law-making and law-enforce-
ment, even at some cost in increased legal indeterminacy.25
21. See, e.g., HARRY BERAN, THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1987).
22. See Sherry, supra note 19, at 919 n.3.
23. For relevant discussion, see, e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY (1988); BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT (1993); THOMAS
E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY (1992). This, inci-
dentally, is why Ackerman's willingness to judicially enforce a democratically endorsed state
religion is problematic. See ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 14-15. For further relevant discussion,
see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989).
24. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 100 (Anchor
Books ed., 1973). A natural lawyer might, for example, take seriously and give full effect to what
she believes to be a moderately seriously erroneous democratic vote, on the grounds that acced-
ing to even a mistaken such expression promotes the crucial objective moral values of dignity,
autonomy, and equality.
25. See, e.g., POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at 81 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 97, art.
2) ("when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is diminished in so far as custom is
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The natural law theorist, therefore, need not be viewed as relying
upon an allegedly "best moral theory" to restrict or modify the effects
of history and tradition,26 but may equally be seen as insisting that
some abstract "best moral theory" incorporate and reflect, in vital
ways, a range of contingent, vague, or indeterminate culturally-depen-
dent considerations. Nor should it be forgotten that contingent histor-
ical institutions, such as contracts or alleged instances of consent, tend
to work their way back toward an abstract "best moral theory," as
when the law incorporates hazy, contested, and indeterminate consid-
erations such as frustration of purpose, public policy, and substantive
unconscionability into contract doctrine itself.2 7
We thus have some preliminary grounds for suspecting that
despite any natural law focus on discrete principles or "truth," a plau-
sible natural law theory is unlikely to typically generate moral or judi-
cial outcomes more determinately than alternative, non-natural law
theories.2 8 Natural law indeterminacy exists, it seems, in any number
of aspects, but at three general levels. First, there is the problem of
metaphysical indeterminacy, or the mere existence of natural law
answers to moral or judicial problems. Second, there is the problem
of epistemic indeterminacy, or the ascertainability of such natural law
answers by judges or anyone else. Finally, there is the problem of
what we might call juridical indeterminacy, consisting of the special
problems involved in judges' actually applying ascertained natural law
principles to constitutional questions.
abolished"); id. at 82 (qu. 97, art. 3) ("custom has the force of law, abolishes law, and is the
interpreter of law"); id. at 60-61 (qu. 95, art. 3) (human law to be in accordance with custom and
suitable to time and place). With respect to the Framers, James Whitman has formulated the
relevant indeterminacy problem thus: "Revolutionary era lawyers unreflectively conflated rea-
son and custom-which means that, in many respects, we can never draw definitive conclusions
about constitutional interpretation from their writings." James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revo-
lutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (1991).
26. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 12
(1989).
27. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 495-96 (2d ed. 1990) (develop-
ment of the doctrine of unconscionability as a means of limiting otherwise unfair bargains).
28. Roger Shiner classifies natural law theories along with positivist theories of law as
united in rejecting the radical indeterminacy theses associated with the Critical Legal Studies
movement. See ROGER A. SHINER, NORM AND NATURE: THE MOVEMENTS OF LEGAL
THOUGHT 217 (1992). Professor Shiner goes on to associate natural law theory with an emphasis
on flexibility in the law, and positivism with an emphasis on certainty in the law, id. at 326, but it
is difficult to find a more concise exposition of the value of certainty and fixity in the law than
the Summa Theologica I, II qu. 97, art. 2. Nor, on the other hand, do contemporary positivists
seem uniformly inclined to adhere to the value of certainty in the law at any cost in substantive
injustice.
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The problem of metaphysical indeterminacy has been emphasized
by contemporary scholars,2 9 but was recognized to at least some
degree even by Aquinas. Aquinas grants not merely that people actu-
ally disagree more readily over specific issues and problems than over
broad principles generally proscribing harmful conduct, but that the
natural law itself must reflect more "deviations" at the level of con-
crete problems. 31 This is quite apart from any cases in which the natu-
ral law simply does not point to even a useful range of preferred
solutions to jurisprudential or moral problems.
It bears emphasis that while Aquinas sometimes pretends that the
exceptions to familiar natural law principles will be few or readily
specified, Aquinas also admits more forthrightly that the touchstone
for departing from a general rule is the undeniably indeterminate
inquiry into whether applying the rule would be "harmful" or "con-
trary to reason. '31 No list, controversial or uncontroversial, can possi-
bly specify or exhaust such exceptions, regardless of the nature of the
principle involved. The principle that, for example, property rights
should be respected except where doing so would be harmful or
unreasonable is of obviously limited determinacy.
Even assuming the existence of a relevant natural law principle
does not, however, guarantee its epistemic accessibility. 32 John Hart
Ely has famously argued that "you can invoke natural law to support
29. See, e.g., Jeremy Paul, First Principles, 25 CONN. L. REV. 923, 933 (1993) ("[n]atural law
claims might remain credible when framed in terms of generalities ... " but lose credibility with
increasing specificity).
30. See the quotation from the SUMMA THEOLOGICA cited supra note 18. See also POLrr-
ICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at'50 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 94, art. 4) (more specific norms
of natural law as both valid and actually recognized in only a majority of cases). For a related
kind of limitation, see id. at 59 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 95, art. 2) (while some specific
conclusions may be rigorously derived from general natural law principles, some moral problems
simply do not admit of a unique, unequivocal morally best resolution).
31. See id. at 50 (SUMMA TI-mOLOoicA I, II qu. 94, art. 4) (illustrating this principle in the
context of return of deposits). See also BRIAN DAVIES, THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS AoUINAS
246 (1993) (natural law not a list of instructions or table of rules unequivocally governing the
range and variety of legal and moral decisionmaking contexts); R.J. HENLE, SAINT THOMAS
AoUINAS: THE TREATISE ON LAW 269 (1993) (dictates of the natural law rendered indeterminate
in some cases by relevant contingent particular circumstances). For a broader indeterminacy
problem, see id. at 288 ("[A]ccording to St. Thomas, the Natural Law provides only general
principles and general precepts which cannot possibly dictate all the detailed determinations
necessary for the Common Good of any given society").
32. For discussion of this distinction, see, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determi-
nacy, Objectivity and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1993); Brian Leiter, Objectivity and the
Problems of Jurisprudence, 72 TEX. L. REV. 187, 190 (1992) (reviewing KENT GREENAWALT,
LAW AND OBJEcnvrry (1992)).
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anything you want,"33 and at least part of his point seems to be episte-
mic rather than metaphysical. In this, Ely reflects the equally well-
known observation of Justice Iredell that "[t]he ideas of natural justice
are regulated by no fixed standard; the ablest and the purest men have
differed upon the subject.... 34
We shall briefly recur to the problems of metaphysical and episte-
mic indeterminacy below. In the meantime, though, the problem of
what we have referred to as the juridical indeterminacy of natural law
is of special interest. There are special reasons, peculiar to the consti-
tutional or judicial decision-making context, that exacerbate the over-
all problem of indeterminacy. Plainly, judges cannot interpret and
apply the Constitution in some sort of clinically objective fashion,
even by invoking the idea of natural law.35 There are several reasons
why natural law theory ordinarily provides only limited guidance to
the judge seeking to resolve constitutional issues.
Among the most important such reasons, though not widely dis-
cussed, is what we shall call the correspondence problem. The corre-
spondence problem refers to the fact that there may well be a partial,
if not a complete, disjunction between the basic principles of a plausi-
ble particular natural law system and the basic principles embodied in
the federal Constitution. The disjunction flows from the fact that a
natural law system tends to focus on the most generally crucial
problems of morality, whereas a Constitution may well have goals or
functions only tangentially related to promoting moral conduct
generally.
The lack of correspondence between the subject-matter or func-
tions of natural and constitutional law should not, of course, be over-
stated. Some overlap is almost inevitable in certain respects.
Consider, for example, Aquinas' natural law injunction that the bur-
den of a just law should be imposed equally or proportionately upon
33. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 50 (1980). See also Calvin R. Massey,
The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 49,49 (1992) (quoting
Ely on this point).
34. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798). See also Helen K. Michael, The Role of
Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial
Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 452 (1991) (quoting Justice
Iredell's opinion).
35. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 771 (1982).
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the subjects,36 which is plainly suggestive of the constitutional ideas of
equal protection and due process.37
But the primary focus of at least Aquinas' version of the natural
law does not link up consistently with American constitutional princi-
ples. More broadly, we cannot expect even modern exponents of gen-
eral natural law theories to revise and recast their understandings of
what they take to be the genuinely basic moral problems so as to shed
more light on the particular jurisprudential issues arising under the
Constitution.
Aquinas, for example, plainly thinks of the natural law as involv-
ing precepts such as preserving one's life,38 knowing the truth about
God,39 living in society,4" not offending others,4' shunning igno-
rance,42 returning borrowed items,43 not stealing, 4" avoiding adul-
tery,45 not harming others,' not killing others,47 and generally
punishing evil.48 These and similar matters obviously constitute the
essential practical concerns and implications of at least the Thomistic
version of the natural law. But to speak bluntly, these matters are in
the main not central to, or even relevant to, our federal Constitution,
including its protections of individual rights. To a great extent, then,
the Thomistic natural lawyer and the judge considering a constitu-
tional issue are simply not on the same wavelength, and are not even
considering the same problems at different levels of generality. By
and large, even our constitutional rights do not track, correspond to,
mirror, or amount to reformulations or concrete specifications of Tho-
mistic natural law duties.
It should be freely admitted that Aquinas discusses matters such
as property ownership, and punishment, and that the Constitution in
turn provides for the due process protection of property interests,49
36. See POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at 71 (SUMMA TREOLOGICA I, II qu. 96, art. 4).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
38. See POLMtICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at 46 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 94, art. 2).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 49-50 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 94, art. 4).
44. See id. (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 94, art. 5, ob. 2).
45. See id. at 51.
46. See id. at 53 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 94, art. 5, reply obj. 3).
47. See id. at 59 (SUMMA TimOLOGICA I, 1I qu. 94, art. 5, obj. 2).
48. See id.
49. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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and proscribes cruel and unusual punishments." But it must equally
be noted how indeterminate Aquinas leaves the natural law in these
and other respects. The broad institution of private property itself,
and the allocation of particular property rights to particular persons, is
thought by Aquinas to reflect positive law or historically contingent
human agreement, and to at most amount to an addition to a natural
law which originally provided for property to be held in common.5 1
And while the natural law generally provides punishment for, indeter-
minately, some but far from all evil conduct, 52 punishing evil in any
particular way, or to any particular degree, is at best not incompatible
with the natural law, and draws no moral force or sanction from the
natural law.53
There are thus indeterminacies where the natural law is silent,
does not judicially address a particular kind of evil, or allows for a
broad range of not unacceptable judicial determinations. These inde-
terminacies plainly differ in kind from the indeterminacy of not know-
ing whether something about our particular circumstances takes us
out of the coverage of an otherwise applicable broad principle of natu-
ral law, as referred to above.54
Now, one could obviously avoid any indeterminacies specific to
Aquinas by subscribing to any non-Thomistic natural law theory. One
could instead endorse some natural law theory that dovetails more
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
51. See POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at 130 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1I, II qu. 66, art. 2,
reply obj. 1). For a brief discussion of Aquinas on changes in the natural law, and of the legiti-
macy of occasional departures from the natural law, see Paul E. Sigmund, Law and Politics, in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS 217, 225-27 (Norman Kretzmann & Eleonore Stump
eds., 1993). For startlingly contrasting perspectives in the context of the Framers' approach to
natural law, compare Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1127, 1133 (1987) (fundamental law as susceptible to limited change for Framers) with Farber,
supra note 1, at 1093 (framers as largely indifferent to possibility of change in fundamental law)
and Paul Campos, Three Mistakes About Interpretation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 388, 389 (1993)
(apparently assuming that mainstream natural law theory would see no reason to provide for
changes in natural law).
52. See POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at 59 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 95, art. 2).
See also Randy E. Barnett, The Intersection of Natural Rights and Positive Constitutional Law, 25
CONN. L. REV. 853, 861 n.23 (1993).
53. See POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at 59 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 95, art. 2).
54. See supra notes 10-11, 18, 30, 31 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., POLITICAL
IDEAS, supra note 10, at 50 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, I1 qu. 94, art. 4) (while deposits should
generally be restored to their owner, the deposit should not be so restored if to do so would be
"harmful and consequently contrary to reason").
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closely with the concerns of the Constitution, and which typically pro-
vides more determinate answers to important questions of constitu-
tional law. Unless one had other reasons for endorsing the alternative
natural law theory in question, though, such a course would seem ad
hoc, if not irresponsible. Presumably, one would reject Thomistic nat-
ural law theory in favor of some alternative natural law theory primar-
ily because the latter is thought to be in some sense truer, and not
because it ties in more neatly with pressing constitutional issues, how-
ever false the theory itself may be.
Admittedly, it need not be ad hoc to announce oneself, for exam-
ple, a Lockean natural lawyer, with an eye to r idorsing Locke's
emphasis on the right or duty of preserving life, liberty, and property 55
and applying those concerns in our constitutional context. But taking
Locke's natural law theory seriously would mean accepting its basic
logic, which explains the obligations not to harm other persons in their
life, liberty, and property on the grounds that each of us is legally held
to be the property, or the servant, of God.56
No doubt Lockean natural law could be secularized, with some
purely secular principles taking over the crucial justificatory role. But
it is difficult to believe that any modified and attractive Lockean natu-
ral law theory would be generally more determinate in its judicial or
constitutional implications than some plausible alternative non-natu-
ral theory of constitutional interpretation.57
This is not to suggest that a relatively determinate natural law
theory of constitutional interpretation cannot be imagined. It can.
This follows from the reasonable premises that not all possible theo-
ries of constitutional interpretation are equally indeterminate, and
that any non-natural law theory of constitutional interpretation can be
re-cast in analogous natural law or moral objectivist terms.
55. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 123, at 395 (Peter Laslett rev.
ed., 1965).
56. See id. § 6, at 211 & § 135 at 403. See also JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGrr OF
JOHN LocKE 127 (1969); Patrick Riley, Locke on "Voluntary Agreement" and Political Power, 29
W. POL. Q. 136, 136-37 (1976); Bruce N. Morton, John Locke, Robert Bork, Natural Rights and
the Interpretation of the Constitution, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 709, 723 (1992); J.B. Schneewind,
Kant and Natural Law Ethics, 104 ETHics 53, 63, 73 (1993) (discussing the relevantly similar view
of Kant as well as that of Locke).
57. Even a secularized Lockean natural law probably emphasizes peace, safety, and per-
sonal security more than does our Constitution. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 55, § 131, at 399.
This lack of "correspondence" is of course remediable by further modifying "Lockean" natural
law theory, but the essential problems of judicial indeterminacy, or the lack of any advantage in
this respect over non-natural law theories of constitutional interpretation, remain.
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Consider, for example, the relatively complete and determinate
approach to constitutional interpretation which we may call the con-
temporaneous Gallup Poll theory. On this theory, constitutional
issues are to be resolved by judges in accordance with a popular opin-
ion poll tapping preferences as among litigant-framed alternatives on
the day following oral argument in the case at issue. The plurality
response is then deemed to be what the Constitution requires.
While the Gallup Poll theory may not avoid all indeterminacy, it
is clearly better than most in this respect. Nor is it utterly devoid of
any normative appeal, at least for all those who consider contempo-
rary mores a partial guide to constitutional adjudication.58 Inevitably,
the Gallup Poll theory comes in a natural law version, which would
hold that the poll results not only indicate popular preferences or
beliefs, but also indicate the genuinely objective, if transient, moral
truth regarding constitutional issues, including matters of free speech,
the establishment of religion, equal protection, and due process.
Admittedly, then, we can imagine a possible natural law theory of
constitutional interpretation no less determinate than some rival non-
natural law theory. But the natural law and non-natural law versions
of the Gallup Poll theory of constitutional interpretation are not
equally plausible. Despite any grounds for believing that the vox
populi is the vox Dei,59 the non-natural law version of the Gallup Poll
theory is, on its own terms, more plausible to most of us than its natu-
ral law counterpart.
Let us contrast the two versions of the Gallup Poll theory, begin-
ning with the non-natural law version. Deciding a constitutional law
case by ascertaining current popular preferences in the matter is at
least sometimes a plausible approach, if natural law theories are to be
ruled out. But the natural law analogue of this Gallup Poll theory,
that mere plurality preference either constitutes, or somehow system-
atically reflects or points toward, objective moral truth, is simply not
as plausible.60
58. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 136, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
59. The English theologian Alcuin urged that "those people should not be listened to who
keep saying the voice of the people is the voice of God, since the riotousness of the crowd is
always very close to madness." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 8 (Angela Parting-
ton ed., 4th ed. 1992).
60. Admittedly, there is some Thomistic support for the view that at least the most abstract
and general principles of natural law are known to most persons and most cultures, even though
the natural law is not ordinarily constituted by popular subjective belief. See, e.g., POLITICAL
NATURAL LAW THEORY OF ANY USE?
Both the natural law and non-natural law versions of the Gallup
Poll theory tend to cope poorly with any counter-majoritarian role for
our Constitution. This is thus a defect both versions share. But the
two versions are in another respect not equally plausible on their own
terms. At least in the modem era, an important potential function of
an attractive natural law theory is not only to protect various sorts of
minorities against unsympathetic pluralities, but more generally to
uphold the notion that there is more to truth than nose-counting.61 A
natural law theory that merely points back to nothing more than nose-
counting of perhaps arbitrarily formed popular preferences is thus
unconvincing as a theory of objective truth and natural law. Thus,
while the natural law version of the Gallup Poll theory may be no less
determinate in its implications than its non-natural law analogue, it is
less plausible on its own terms, because of its peculiarly awkward
attempt to combine nose-counting and objectivity, a vice not shared
by the non-natural law version of the Gallup Poll theory.
In general, otherwise genuinely plausible natural law theories of
constitutional interpretation tend to be relatively indeterminate, com-
pared to at least some non-natural law alternative equally plausible on
its own terms. Whether natural law approaches can offer any counter-
vailing advantages, however, is an issue we shall briefly explore
below.62
In the meantime, we should appreciate a further problem of inde-
terminacy. Even if a judge believes that there is a natural law, that the
natural law is logically relevant to the constitutional issues in the case,
and that the relevant natural law principles are genuinely ascertain-
able, not just in principle, but by that judge,63 a further source of inde-
terminacy looms. It is actually far from clear that a natural law judge
IDEAS, supra note 10, at 50 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, 11 qu. 94, art. 4). But, especially in a
diverse, pluralistic culture such as ours, it is simply not credible that public opinion poll results
on concrete, specific contested issues of constitutional law reliably reflect the objective moral
truth. To imagine, for example, that the genuinely objective moral status of affirmative action or
capital punishment is reliably reflected in, or typically hops about in deference to shifts in, popu-
lar opinion is to decline to take natural law seriously. This conclusion must, admittedly, be quali-
fied to reflect the extent to which the natural lawyer may legitimately want to take matters such
as current custom, binding contracts, or the democratic process into account. See supra notes 20-
27 and accompanying text.
61. This is not to suggest that all natural law theories of constitutional interpretation are
adequately sensitive to minority rights, or that non-natural law theories cannot be adequately
sensitive to minority rights. Both of these clearly false claims are irrelevant to our argument.
62. See infra part III.
63. We may, for our purposes, at least temporarily set aside the complication of any disa-
greement between the judge and the authoritatively interpreted Constitution.
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should allow her constitutional decisions to be guided by the appar-
ently most directly applicable substantive principles of natural law.
It is occasionally argued that the natural law judge will tend to
focus on presumably objectively true moral principles relevant to the
case.64 This may well be commonly true, and at least in some meta-
sense, perhaps must be true: why would a conscientious natural law
judge intentionally decide a constitutional case contrary to the natural
law?
But on reflection, there are any number of reasons why a natural
law judge might, in a way that typically tends to further reduce the
determinacy of natural law theory in constitutional adjudication, wish
to subordinate the substance of the natural law. For example, judges
typically undertake an oath to uphold the Constitution, whether that
Constitution is normally construed in a natural law fashion or not.
There may be no guarantee that the authoritatively construed Consti-
tution will be invariably fully compatible with the particular judge's
own understanding, or any judge's understanding, of the provisions of
the natural law. Admittedly, reconciling the natural law with a volun-
tary promise by the judge to, in effect, decide some cases in a way
somehow apparently inconsistent with the natural law may itself be a
higher order natural law question, but the substantive precepts of the
natural law may regardless be set aside in some or all such cases. Nor
is the indeterminacy avoided by arguing that the natural law may itself
require judges to uphold their judicial oaths in some or all cases. The
judge must still choose between keeping the oath, and choosing what
in the absence of the oath, and perhaps even given the oath, would be
mandated by natural law.
As well, a natural law judge might easily conclude that one possi-
ble case law outcome is less justifiable under the general principles of
natural law than another, but nonetheless preferable overall, as
reflecting the values of custom and tradition, or for that matter, nov-
elty. Or a judge might conclude that an outcome otherwise contrary
to the most relevant substantive principles of natural law might be
rescued by its contribution to the objective moral value of tolerance,
64. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
277, 287-88 (1985). In defining natural law interpretation, though, Professor Moore requires
only some unspecified, potentially quite limited role for natural law, as opposed to a shared or
conventional morality. Id. at 286. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 739, 752 (1982) ("[T]he natural law tradition ... demands that the judge give morality the
decisive role in the interpretation of the legal text").
NATURAL LAW THEORY OF ANY USE?
autonomy, pluralism, stability, peace, or democratic self-determina-
tion. There are any number of objective moral grounds for reasonable
governmental self-restraint in enforcing particular moral norms in
particular cases.65 This sort of logic again tends to enhance the inde-
terminacy of natural law adjudication. It is of course possible to again
observe that no natural law principle that is properly trumped by
other legitimate natural law-based considerations can possibly be
what the natural law requires, but this merely formal point does not
restore the adjudicative determinacy of the natural law in this respect.
As a final, related example, consider the problems of the practical
enforceability of judicial decrees, preservation of judicial "institu-
tional capital," or even of judicial institutional prestige. Again, it is
possible to argue that the natural law itself has long recognized 66 and
even sought to resolve conflicts between an abstractly right answer,
and the high costs to natural law and other valuable institutions of
seeking to impose that ideal result on a recalcitrant legal environment.
Natural lawyers are as aware as anyone of the costs of judicial deci-
sions' backfiring, or of bringing sound judicial institutions into disre-
pute. The judicial indeterminacy, however, remains.
Each of these further judicial indeterminacy problems may, in
principle, be resolvable. But the apparent absence of determinate
solutions raises a further indeterminacy for the natural law judge:
Should she resolve such issues based on her own best insight into the
natural law, or should she defer, in at least some cases, to the poten-
tially incompatible view of what the natural law really requires that is
held by some other governmental branch or actor?67 While natural
65. For a concise but thorough discussion of such possible reasons, see Julia Driver, Hyper-
active Ethics, 44 PFUL. Q. 9 (1994).
66. See, e.g., POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at 68 (SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II qu. 96, art.
2, reply obj. 2) ("[O]therwise these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would
break out into yet greater evils"). See also Thomas B. McAffee, Prolegomena to a Meaningful
Debate of the "Unwritten Constitution" Thesis, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 107, 116 n.31, 117 n.32 (1992)
(discussing Aquinas on this point).
67. Cf Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 809 (1993)
("[t]hat there are natural rights does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is the task of
particular officials to identify and enforce them") (emphasis in the original). See also the
exchange between Sotirios A. Barber, supra note 3, and Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist
Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 Ctn.-KENT L. REV. 89 (1988), and the stronger claim of
Professor Thomas Nagel, The Supreme Court and Political Philosophy, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 519,
519 (1981) ("Even a believer in the existence of objectively discoverable ethical truth will not
want to assign to the Court general jurisdiction over the determination and enforcement of that
truth."). For an unusually sensitive, concise exposition of the related broader problems of
unduly casual inferences from the mere existence of objective moral truth to its ascertainment by
specified officers to its coercive implementation, see Kent Greenawalt, Shortfalls of Realism,
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law theory may purport to offer at least some vague answer even here,
we may have more confidence in a judge whose decisions in this
respect flow not from any contested reading of the natural law, but
from what we happen to take to be the exceptional integrity, judg-
ment, character, and fitness of some particular judge,68 however inde-
terminate the specification of these judicial virtues may be. To the
extent that each natural law judge may or may not be the best judge of
the natural law, as compared to other judges or to elected officials,
this final judicial indeterminacy problem remains.
Certainly, these sorts of indeterminacy problems may, in some
loosely analogous form, afflict non-natural law-based theories as well.
But as we have seen, natural law theories tend to close the indetermi-
nacy gap relative to non-natural law theories only by sacrificing
plausibility.
III. NATURAL LAW AND THE VALUE OF OBJECTIVITY
Given the multiple, quite substantial, and not readily resolvable
indeterminacies attendant upon any otherwise plausible natural law
theory of constitutional adjudication, it is tempting to conclude by
simply minimizing the value of such theories. Michael Oakeshott
endorsed this view when he concluded that "the correspondence of a
political proposal with Natural Law ...must be considered either
irrelevant or as clumsy formulations of other and relevant inquiries,
and must be understood to have a merely rhetorical or persuasive
Shared Social Values, and Authority: The Problem of Political Coercion, 73 J. RELIGION 537, 542-
43 (1993).
68. See Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107,
136-37 (1989); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 251
(1992); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REV.
747, 747 (1992). For some Thomistic background, see THOMAS AOUINAS, TREATISE ON THE
VIRTUES (John Oesterle trans., 1966) and POLITICAL IDEAS, supra note 10, at 49-50 (SUMMA
THEOLOGICA I, 1I qu. 94, art. 4) (discussing differences in aptitude or disposition among persons
in recognizing precepts of the natural law). The crucial, and today underemphasized, role of
phronesis or prudence in political decisionmaking is of course classically expounded in ARIS-
TOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS book 6, chs. 5-11.
NATURAL LAW THEORY OF ANY USE?
value."'69 When we toss in the suspicion that key concepts in any plau-
sible language-embedded natural law theory of constitutional adjudi-
cation will be "essentially contestable,"70 or inherently approachable
from conflicting perspectives, the prospects for such a natural law the-
ory appear bleak.
But it should be remembered that we have been defining natural
law not much more narrowly than any judicial appeal to moral objec-
tivity. We should therefore grant that natural law theories have no
distinct, special value only if the idea of moral objectivity itself in this
context has no distinct, special value. Now, just this thesis has been
impressively argued for.71 We shall, however, briefly argue to the con-
trary, for the distinctive value of moral objectivity, and thereby for the
distinctive value of natural law, despite the admitted multiple indeter-
minacy of the latter.
In contemporary philosophy, the idea of objectivity is used in any
number of senses. Objectivity in the law often means something quite
different than objectivity in morality. And certainly, there are several
possible meanings of objectivity in the legal context and in the moral
context. On many understandings, the objectivity of morals does not
imply legal objectivity, and legal objectivity does not imply moral
objectivity. Even if all stealing were morally wrong, for example, that
would not imply a legal system that constrains or should constrain the
discretion of the judge in cases of actual or alleged stealing. The ready
accessibility of legally right answers to legal questions hardly implies
that those answers will be objectively morally right. Nor, for that mat-
ter, does either moral or legal objectivity say very much about the
69. Michael Oakeshott, Political Education, in RATIONALISM AND PoLIrIcs AND OTHER
ESSAYS 111, 134 (1984). Cf. Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in the
Law, 78 CAL- L. REV. 1443, 1448-50 (1990) (seeking to reject the pretension to objectivity in the
law, while avoiding a descent into arbitrary, subjective decisionmaking).
70. The crucial cite for this notion is W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PRoc.
OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 167 (1956). See also WIL.IAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF
POLrTCAL DISCOURSE 10-41 (1974); Alasdair Maclntyre, The Essential Contestability of Some
Social Concepts, 84 ETmcS 1, 9 (1974) (perhaps inadvisedly citing the idea of a contract as not
falling into the essentially contested category). See also Fiss, supra note 64, at 743 (asking
whether 'freedom' pertains "exclusively to the absence of restraint, or does it also embrace an
affirmative capacity for self-realization?") quoting I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty in FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
71. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THE-
ORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 158 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). For background, see, e.g.,
SIMON BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN QUAsi-REALISM (1992). For further development of Waldron's
views, see Jeremy Waldron, Assurances of Objectivity, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 553 (1993)
(reviewing KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECIVITY (1992)).
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degree of determinacy or indeterminacy or ready ascertainability of
appropriate legal judgments.
We should thus feel free to define moral objectivity and legal
objectivity pretty much as we wish. Presumably, we will want to
define objectivity in either context in such a way as to allow us to
confront and resolve some theoretical or practical problem with which
we are concerned. What we must not do, however, is to define objec-
tivity in one way for purposes of confronting one problem, while
assuming that the same conception of objectivity will serve equally
well in resolving some related, but distinct problem.
Let us briefly illustrate. It is common enough to define legal
objectivity in terms, roughly, of the logical or practical constraints on
judicial decisionmaking imposed by the shared conventional under-
standings of some relevant legal interpretive community in which the
judge is assumed to hold membership. We may assume that this sort
of conventionalist-communitarian view of legal objectivity is suited to
resolving certain genuine problems including, most obviously, that of
utterly capricious, subjective, personally idiosyncratic judicial deci-
sionmaking. Recourse to convention and community can conceivably
be used to at least criticize, if not effectively discourage, personal idi-
osyncracy in judicial decisionmaking.
But sheer personal idiosyncracy is not the only way in which judi-
cial decisionmaking may go awry. A judicial decision might, for exam-
ple, be a thoroughly conventional, predictable, rigorously systematic
application of the most relevant shared group norms, yet strike at
least an outsider as a moral outrage. The understanding of legal
objectivity referred to above may control individual idiosyncracy, but
by its own terms may rise no higher than some sort of convention-
bound legal group relativism. It is at least conceivable that someone
from some vantage point may want to say that the group's conven-
tions are in relevant part wrong. It is admittedly possible to denounce
one group's legal conventions merely from the standpoint of another
group's contrasting legal conventions. But a reasonable person could
imagine that such a critique may ultimately have less purchase than a
critique of a different sort, based on the claim that a legal judgment
may be legally objectively sound in the above sense, yet morally
objectively unsound, or unsound in a stronger sense of legal objectiv-
ity, transcending mere group conventions.
We shall develop this theme below. In the meantime, there are
popular conceptions of legal objectivity that do not afford much of a
NATURAL LAW THEORY OF ANY USE?
handle on theoretical and practical problems of great potential impor-
tance that might be more readily manageable by reference to moral
objectivity, perhaps in conjunction with stronger conceptions of legal
objectivity.
While we shall not pin down a precise meaning of the idea of
objectivity, we shall nonetheless require the use of a fairly strong
sense of the term.72 Objectivity in a weak sense may again require
only something like transcending some particular specified bias, 73
authoritativeness,74 a standard external to the decisionmaker whether
that standard is authoritative or not,75 or a matter of judgment disci-
plined and constrained by some standard-setting community rules.7 6
Stronger senses of objectivity might thus involve the fuller tran-
scending of bias or of mere group conventional norms, or the tran-
scending and correction of what might be called appearances.77
Obviously, there are other ways of conceiving of strong senses of
objectivity. But even the apparently obscure idea of correcting
appearances is often serviceable. This idea need not require us to
miraculously step outside of our own perceptions and conventions in
any problematic sense. We correct appearances, or at least better
understand them, in the empirical or scientific realm when we decide,
for example, that apparently straight sticks are not fractured by
immersion in water and repaired by withdrawal from water, possible
appearances to the contrary.
72. For one possible typology of different senses of the term 'objective,' see Brian Leiter,
supra note 32, at 192-93. Arguably the most useful extended treatment of the various possible
senses of 'objectivity' in both moral and legal contexts is provided in KENT GREENAWALT, LAW
AND OBJECa'ITvr (1992).
73. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Questionable Objectivity, 27 Nocs 355, 361 (1993); Heidi Li
Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 1187, 1212-13 (1994) (purpose of idea
of legal or judicial objectivity is to contrast with the subjective, or with the arbitrary, purely
personal, idiosyncratic or the whimsical, thereby providing interpersonal validity); David Milton,
Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10, 23-24, 32 (1992) (legal objectivity as refer-
ring to internal constraints on interpretation arising from membership in a shared interpretive
community, not to correspondence to reality).
74. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445,
447 (1984).
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 64, at 744. See also id. at 748 ("Objectivity is compatible with
error: An objective interpretation is not necessarily a correct one.").
77. See, e.g., JONATHAN DANCY, MORAL REASONS 146-47 (1993) (characterizing the
approach to the idea of objectivity taken by Thomas Nagel).
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It is worth noting that any inclination to abandon the idea of
objectivity in jurisprudence is not supported by any analogous con-
temporary abandonment of the pursuit of objectivity in science.78
Contemporary interest, either explicit 79 or implicit,8" in sophisticated
versions of objectivity theses in science seems vigorous. There is, in
fact, a case to be made for the view that without obvious logical fal-
lacy, objective progress in basic science can loosely, suggestively sup-
port particular basic objective moral approaches and models.8' For
example, the pursuit of scientific objectivity may lead us in the direc-
tion of appreciating the inherent relatedness of persons, or the ines-
capability of a holistic, as opposed to a discretely atomistic, view of all
that exists.s2
78. Cf. ELY, supra note 33, at 52 ("[Plerhaps physical laws will be found 'out there,' though
even that faith is fraying, but in any event moral laws will not.").
79. See, e.g., JAMES ROBERT BROWN, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: How SCIENCE REFLECTS
REALITY (1994) (realist accounts as, at least, providing enlightenment by embedding those
events in broader narrative accounts indicating why the event in question was a non-miraculous
possibility); MICHAEL DEVIT, REALISM AND TRUTH (2d ed. 1991); RICHARD HEALEY, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS: AN INTERACTIVE INTERPRETATION 6-7 (1989); PHILIP
KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE 161-62 (1993) (Realism "does not imply that we
have unbiased access to nature, merely that the biases are not so powerful that they prevent us
from working our way out of false belief"); id. at 162 n.45 (arguing that epistemic foundational-
ism has more often than not been associated with antirealism, rather than realism); DAVID PAPI-
NEAU, REALITY AND REPRESENTATION (1987).
80. See, e.g., NANCY CARTWRIGHT, NATURE'S CAPACITIES AND THEIR MEASUREMENT
(1993) (setting aside some basic issues, but relying upon the ideas of general and single-case
causation, as well as on the "capacity" of properties of entities to produce effects); Yakir Aharo-
nov, Jeeva Anandan, and Lev Vaidman, Meaning of the Wave Function, 47 PHYSICAL REV. A
4614 (1993); Yakir Aharonov & Lev Vaidman, Measurement of the Schrodinger Wave of a Single-
Particle, 178 PHYSICS LETTERS A 38 (1993); Wojciech H. Zurek, Decoherence and the Transition
from Quantum to Classical, 44 PHYSICS TODAY 36 (1991). See also Chris J. Isham, Quantum
Theories of the Creation of the Universe, in QUANTUM COSMOLOGY AND THE LAWS OF NATURE
49, 89 (Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy & Chris J. Isham eds., 1993) (noting that one
possible "escape" from an emphasis on holism and interdependence in physics may be, interest-
ingly, a far more "realist" view of quantum phenomena than has been orthodox).
81. See, e.g., JOHN LESLIE, UNIVERSES 198 (1989); JOHN POLKINGHORNE, REASON AND
REALITY 77 (1991); William Lane Craig, Theism and Big Bang Cosmology, 69 AUSTRALASIAN J.
PHIL 492 (1991); Richard Swinburne, Argument from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe, in PHYSI-
CAL COSMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 154 (John Leslie ed., 1990); Joseph M. Zycinski, The
Anthropic Principle and Teleological Interpretations of Nature, 41 REV. METAPHYSICS 317 (1987).
See also R. GEORGE WRIGHT, REASON AND OBLIGATION ch. 7 (1994). But see, e.g., Adolf
Grtnbaum, Creation As a Pseudo-Explanation in Current Physical Cosmology, 56 PHI. SCI. 373
(1989); Anthony O'Hear, Science and Religion, 44 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 505, 511 (1993); Quentin
Smith, The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe, 55 PHIL. SCI. 39 (1988); Victor J. Stenger, The
Universe: The Ultimate Free Lunch, 11 EUROPEAN J. PHYSICS 236 (1990). More neutrally, see
Ernan McMullin, Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in Cosmology, 24 STUD. HIST.
PHIL. SCI. 359 (1993).
82. See, e.g., Henry Stapp, Quantum Theory and the Physicist's Conception of Nature: Phil-
osophical Implications of Bell's Theorem, in TiE WORLD VIEW OF CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS:
NATURAL LAW THEORY OF ANY USE?
No doubt jurisprudential theories that reject any objectivity of
morals can very widely imitate natural law theories. Writers who
reject all moral objectivity are not logically barred from adapting
familiar moral concepts, such as "growth" and "improvement, '8 3 for
use in attenuated senses.
As well, there is nothing to stop a society that rejects moral objec-
tivity from instructing its judges to occasionally overturn statutes, for
example, on moral grounds. Such a society may, for any reason or no
reason, simply ascribe great value to avoiding error in recognizing and
applying its non-objective moral norms, and may consider judges to be
in at least some cases more able defenders of those moral norms than
are legislators.
Thus societies that reject moral objectivity can in a sense talk, and
judicially act, like societies that do not. Whether societies can eschew
moral objectivity while, from our current standpoint, likely remaining
morally attractive over the long term is more doubtful. It is at least
initially jarring to be told, for example, by Richard Rorty that there is
no moral fact of the matter regarding, or objective moral difference
between, a thoroughly socialized Third Reich and a world without
Nazism.'
DOES IT NEED A NEW METAPHYSICS? 38, 57 (R. Kitchener ed., 1988) (A human "appears no
longer as an isolated automaton"); Paul Teller, Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics, 37
BRrr. J. PHIL. Sci. 71, 73 (1986) (discussing inherent, as opposed to merely supervenient, related-
ness among apparently separate individuals). For broader discussion, see PHILOSOPHICAL CON-
SEQUENCES OF QUANTUM THEORY: REFLECTIONS ON BELL'S THEOREM (James Cushing &
Ernan McMullin eds., 1989). For relevant discussion, see R. George Wright, Should the Law
Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
855 (1991). For a possible extension of inseparability, see Gerhard C. Hegerfeldt, Causality
Problems for Fermi's Two-Atom System, 72 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 596 (1994). Especially in
light of the affinity between much feminist theory and some version of inherent relationalism,
see Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1401
(1986) (linking results in physics to feminist theory).
83. See, e.g., OWEN FLANAGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY: ETHICS AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL REALISM 334-35 (1991); Jeffrey Stout, Truth, Natural Law, and Ethical Theory, in
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 71 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). But cf.
Owen Flanagan, Review of Charles Taylor's The Malaise of Modernity, 104 ETHICS 192, 194
(1993) (expressing less confidence in the viability of a merely constructed, non-objective
morality).
84. See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Putnam and the Relativist Menace, 90 J. PHIL. 443, 451 (1993).
Rorty analogizes the situation to the lack of any moral or other objective preferability that one
species survive a Darwinian conflict with another species. Id. For a contrasting perspective on
the possibility of moral objectivity, see THOMAS KENEALLY, SCHINDLER'S LIST (1993). For an
example of a more explicitly philosophical response, see Robert Kane, The Ends of Metaphysics,
33 INT. PHiHL Q. 413 (1993), and, more broadly, ROBERT KANE, THROUGH THE MORAL MAZE:
SEARCHING FOR ABSOLUTE VALUES IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (1994).
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It seems to be assumed by most contemporary academics who
reject moral objectivity that such a rejection will tend to promote, or
at least not discourage, the instantiation of traditional liberal or pro-
gressive communitarian values.85 But it has been noticed that the
grounds for this undeniably attractive assumption are dubious.86
Doubtless many morally objectivist societies have, by current stan-
dards, been far less morally sound or attractive than others. It may
even be true that the worst possible morally objectivist society is less
attractive than some feasible non-objectivist society. But it is difficult
to escape the impression that most liberals and progressive com-
munitarians wish to see, at least among dominant groups, more self-
sacrifice, self-restraint at the level of individuals and groups, altruistic
behavior, and genuine concern for strangers than is likely to be
uncoercedly on widespread display, in the long run, in most societies
that have wrung moral objectivity out of their thinking.87 The major
problem may well not be excessive overt social conflict, but preoccu-
pation with concerns of self and one's group that are both metaphysi-
cally unambitious and not directly conflict-generating, such as the
pursuit of low-cost gratifying sensory experiences. The pursuit of
basic gratifications need not involve contested metaphysical presup-
positions, significant claims on others, or the significant redistribution
of power or wealth.
85. See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeoise Liberalism, 80 J. PHIL 583 (1983).
86. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The Left Critique of Normativity, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2325,
2346 (1992). See also STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 36 (1986)
(noting the moral skepticism of Robert Bork). If one were forced to speculate on the roots of
the belief that rejecting moral objectivity will tend to be politically progressive, one might start
with the undeniable oppressiveness of some, but not all, historical moral systems claiming objec-
tivity, as well as the hope that moral relativism will promote the interests of oppressed groups
better than any asserted objective moral rightness of pluralism, tolerance, and diversity. And on
some versions of Marxism, academics could identify with the interests of the historically inevita-
ble victors, the working class, without relying on moral objectivity.
87. See, e.g., O'Hear, supra note 81, at 514; Timothy P. Jackson, The Theory and Practice of
Discomfort: Richard Rorty and Pragmatism, 51 THOMIST 270, 289 (1987). But see Richard T.
Garner, Are Convenient Fictions Harmful to Your Health?, 43 PHIL. EAST & WEST 87, 98 (1993)
(discussing the work of Simon Blackburn and relying upon "informed compassion" in the
absence of any objectivity in ethics). See also RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND
SOLIDARITY 85 (1989); Fred D'Agostino, Transcendence and Objectivity: Two Conceptions of
Objectivity, 30 AM. PHIL. Q. 87 (1993); Mark Douglas Mercer, On a Pragmatic Argument Against
Pragmatism in Ethics, 30 AM. PHIL Q. 163 (1993); Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The
Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 535. It might be that
compassion in the absence of objectivity tends, if we are not all equally compassionate, to invite
exploitation, by setting up incentives for everyone to adopt increasingly extreme substantive
views, and then demand compassion in the form of partial accommodation of those increasingly
extreme views. This sort of problem may afflict the argument in ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN CONFLICr 359 (1992).
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Self-sacrifice on behalf of strangers, in the absence of any pur-
portedly objective justification, may transiently hold some Romantic
appeal, but that sort of motivation does not seem sufficient to ground
a viable and, on current widely shared standards, attractive moral civi-
lization over time. Ultimately, a bit more metaethical ambitiousness
seems called for. As George Fletcher has recently observed, "[f]or an
argument to be worth making, it must be cast in a language that
appeals to those who have no loyalties to the proponent."8 If we
hope to reach such persons, and to arrive at mutually attractive sus-
tainable results, our best bet involves recourse to metaethical
objectivity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Thus, in sum, it seems reasonable to concede that no otherwise
plausible natural law theory is useful in constitutional interpretation,
as the multiple indeterminacies of such a natural law theory are sub-
stantial, and in fact leave it at a disadvantage in comparison with non-
natural law-based alternatives. There is, however, a deeper sense in
which natural law theory in constitutional and other contexts is indis-
pensable, despite its practical indeterminacy. To abandon the pursuit
of objectivity in the constitutional realm, and presumably elsewhere,
would reasonably predictably tend over time to otherwise avoidably
promote forms of society that most of us, regardless of ideology,
would today find distinctly unattractive.89
It remains, finally, to discuss the mutual consistency of our two
major theses, that of the special and substantial indeterminacy of nat-
ural law adjudication, and the distinctive moral value of some, but
hardly all, varieties of moral objectivism in adjudication and
elsewhere.
It is tempting, and perhaps even correct, to assume that there is a
serious tension between these two theses. Perhaps, to take an
extreme case, we can imagine a world in which judges could readily
discern unique objectively morally best answers to all relevant legal
issues, and would rule in accordance with such answers, at least in the
88. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS
174 (1993). This sentence is extracted from a more extended argument by Professor Fletcher
that is remarkable for its concision, judgment, and eloquence.
89. For a statement of at least roughly this thesis, but with fewer footnotes, see Steven D.
Smith, Book Review of Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 489,
495 (1993).
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absence of special circumstances. Wouldn't such a jurisprudential
regime be morally preferable to our current circumstances, marked
typically by judicial floundering, groping, backtracking, myopia, arbi-
trariness, and indeterminacy?
Actually, that is not so obvious. It would not be difficult to argue
that even if we assume that morally objectivist jurisprudence should
recognize the objective moral values of pluralism, diversity, and toler-
ance, a world with one readily determined best answer to all moral
and jurisprudential questions would verge on self-contradiction, in
that it would tend to degrade, diminish, and impair the dignity of the
human personality. If all of our choices arrived with the best resolu-
tion plainly and inescapably inscribed thereon, the worth of the con-
scientious moral decisionmaker, aspiring to moral progress and moral
responsibility, would be in a crucial respect undermined. Beyond
some point, then, reducing indeterminacy tends paradoxically to
reduce objective moral value in the world.
This is not to suggest, however, that maximizing indeterminacy
tends to maximize objective moral value.9" If no possible answer is
objectively any better than any other possible answer, or if we cannot
in principle recognize any such answers, our choices and our freedom
and ability to choose are equally devoid of objective value and moral
seriousness.
The middle ground, one of various sorts of quite substantial inde-
terminacies, is thus a natural home for the pursuit, and at least occa-
sional tentative or partial grasp, of some degree of moral objectivity.
Despite the indeterminacies the judiciary faces, we can reasonably
detect objective moral differences between imprisoning Oskar Schin-
dler for violation of Nazi edicts9 or not jeopardizing Schindler's res-
cue efforts, between slavery and manumission, and between a typical
child's voluntarily or involuntarily plugging permanently into a delu-
sive "experience machine"' in contrast to living a reasonably normal,
productive life.
90. Compare the irredeemably paradoxical assertion of Roberto Unger that recognizably
objectively true moral principles devalue and trivialize the value of the choosing human person-
ality. See ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PouTIcs 77 (1975).
91. See KENEALLY, supra note 84, at 109-15. But cf. Steven F. Sapontzis, Groundwork for
a Subjective Theory of Ethics, 27 AM. PHIL. Q. 27, 35 (1990) (Nazism as "both historically true,
because its principles continue to define contexts of ethical discussion and determination, and
contextually false, because its principles are inconsistent with those of our ethical tradition").
92. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974). See also the works
of Robert Kane, supra note 84.
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No doubt each of these examples could be controverted. No
doubt our sense of what morality requires or permits in such cases has
changed historically. No doubt improvement of our moral grasp of
such cases in the future is possible. We should be richly conscious of
our fallibility and our frequently demonstrated capacity for barbarism
and intolerance in the name of objectivity. But none of these consid-
erations undermines either the continuing pursuit of some degree of
objectivity or the compatibility of such objectivity with judicial inde-
terminacy. If any opponent of objectivity is troubled by the lack of
popular consensus on many crucial moral issues, let us remember that
objectivity does not imply consensus, that continuing conflicts in basic
interests among persons remains an imposing obstacle to increased
moral consensus, and that real or apparent conflict in basic interests
is itself compatible with some degree of objectivity in moral
decisionmaking.

